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Introduction 
 
In terms of geographical size, population and gross regional product, Asia and Oceania is the 
largest and most heterogeneous of the seven regions examined in the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index. Like other regions of the world, Asia and Oceania has been shaped during 
the past two decades by a previously unknown dynamic in the transition to democracy. Since the 
beginning of the "third wave of democratization," the number of democracies in the region has 
almost tripled. Furthermore, the region is one of the most impressive examples for late 
industrialization and economic modernization.  
Despite these successes, the trends of transformation towards democracy and market economy 
in the region remained ambivalent during the review period of the BTI 2006. Democratization in 
the region remains a fragile process. Unlike in Central and Eastern Europe, there are no 
normative transformation goals that unite all countries in South, Southeast and East Asia. In 
many nations, the status of democracy is low; in a number of countries, democracy broke down 
after a short while. Currently, half of all area countries are governed by authoritarian regimes.  
Although most governments in Asia follow a strategy of market economic reforms, the levels of 
their accomplishments vary widely. During the review period of the BTI 2006, the overall trend in 
the region was not one towards democracy and market economy but one of a pronounced 
decoupling of both transformations. This report provides an overview on these processes in the 
20 countries in the region. It is based on the results of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 
and the underlying country assessments which analyze each individual country in detail. 
Democratic Development  
In terms of democratic development, the regional divide that characterized the region in the 
previous period of the BTI 2003 (1998-2003) continued and has even gained momentum in the 
past three years. As the following table demonstrates, at present, five groups of political regimes 
can be distinguished: 
Table 1: Political Regimes in Asia and Oceania 
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Aside from South Korea and Taiwan, ongoing insurgencies, weak state institutions, ineffective 
public services, porous rule of law and high levels of corruption within public administrations are 
fundamental problems of transformation toward liberal democracy in Asia and Oceania. However, 
even in these two countries, the political institutions and the political party system do not fulfill all 
criteria of a consolidated democracy.  
Compared with the BTI 2003, four countries experienced significant progress or erosion of the 
democratic quality of their polities. On the one hand, in Papua New Guinea, the democracy’s 
problems with an inefficient, corrupt civil service, eroding law and order, poor discipline in the 
army and police, and poor governance have deepened. There is almost universal cynicism 
towards political leaders who are seen as corrupt and self-serving. Most analysts see Papua New 
Guinea as an example of a weak state where the state is unable to implement even the most 
basic policy. In Thailand, there is a pronounced authoritarian shift in the character of Thai politics 
since the advent of the Thaksin government in 2001. In Nepal, democracy, which had existed 
since 1990, fell into complete disarray, when King Gyanendra ended the country’s 15-year 
experiment with democracy and took power for himself in a royal coup d’etat on 4 October 2002 
and, again, on February 1, 2005.  
On the other hand, democratization in Afghanistan made progress during the last three years. 
The crucial steps, of the Bonn Peace Talks (December 2001) which envisaged a democratically 
elected government and a democratic constitution for the country (i.e., Presidential Elections 
2004, Parliamentary Elections 2005) could be realized without major setbacks. Nevertheless, it 
will take decades and many setbacks to establish sound political institutions which are capable 
enough for a self-supporting democracy in Afghanistan. The realization of this goal depends very 
much on the longstanding military, political and economic commitment of the international 
community. Weak stateness constitutes a particularly harsh constraint for political and economic 
development in the country.  
To a lesser extent, this is also the case in many other countries in the region. Only in South Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan, the state monopoly on the use of force—including an efficient and 
professional bureaucracy—is effectively established. Aside from significant deficits of the 
efficiency of the public administration and under harsh authoritarian conditions, the later is also 
true for North Korea. In many other area countries, contestation of the state monopoly on the use 
of force, the lack of effective stateness, and the unfinished task of nation-building overlap in such 
a way that the authority of central governments is challenged by non-state armed groups. 
However, frequency, intensity, and tendency of these features vary considerably, with Thailand 
and Afghanistan being the countries that experienced the most significant changes in recent 
years. In Thailand, tensions between Buddhist Thais and southern Muslims have increased 
dramatically since 2004. In Afghanistan, the leeway of the government has been improving and 
the position of warlords is weakening since 2003.  
Only in about half the region’s countries can the citizenry choose the government in free elections. 
Aside from South Korea and Taiwan, elections in most democracies in the region are to different 
extent characterized by irregularities. In addition, freedom of association, opinion and the press 
are restricted in most “defective” democracies. The elections in Singapore and Malaysia are only 
“semi-competitive”. Restrictions on political rights and civil liberties are particularly pronounced in 
Cambodia and Pakistan. During the review period of the BTI 2006, general elections have further 
solidified the position of the ruling powers in these four countries. There are no opportunities for 
democratic participation in the political process for the citizenry in Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, 
Myanmar and China (except for village elections).  
The shortcomings and gains concerning political participation and stateness correspond to a 
certain degree with the status of the rule of law in the region. In North Korea, China, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam there is neither separation of powers with checks and balances nor an 
independent judiciary; civil rights are severely regulated or are nonexistent. Conversely, the rule 
of law and civil liberties are the best guaranteed in the advanced democracies such as South 
Korea and Taiwan. In the defective democracies in Asia, the liberal side of democracy (rule of law, 
constitutionalism, and civil liberties) is constantly weaker than the electoral facet of democracy. 
Singapore and Malaysia fall in between both categories. They are the only states in the region 
which score better in the dimension of rule of law than in the participatory dimension of 
democracy, among other things because of successful anti-corruption policies.  
Subject to the aforementioned reservations democratic institutions are stable in most 
democracies. In South Korea, gridlock in the years 2003 and 2004 mostly resulted from a lack of 
personal leadership quality of the newly elected president and, simultaneously, the unwillingness 
of the major opposition party to accept its second consecutive defeat at the polls. The 
impeachment trial against President Roh literally paralyzed the government and brought policy-
making to a standstill. The trial, however, turned out to be a victory for liberal democracy when 
the Constitutional Court, according to the constitution, ruled that there was no constitutional point 
to impeach the sitting president. For the first time in the history of Korean democracy, a major 
conflict between the two branches of government was solved by a decision of the third estate—
and all relevant political actors accepted the outcome. Following the March 2004 presidential 
elections, Taiwan’s democracy was high-jacked by a legal brawl on the ballot’s outcome and the 
investigation of an alleged assassination attempt on President Chen on the eve of the presidential 
election. However, the political institutions proved to be strong enough to overcome the turmoil of 
the election aftermath. Recent constitutional amendments in Indonesia have improved the 
autonomy of core institutions of the democratic order such as parliament and Supreme Court, 
although the system of governance is still not free of frictions between institutions, particularly in 
relations between the executive and legislative. In Thailand, the positive implication of the ruling 
party’s legislative superiority and the Prime Minister’s consolidated position as hegemonic 
political leader is stable government and a more efficient cooperation between the legislature and 
the executive. However, this is not necessarily good news for Thai democracy. Stability of 
government and legislative majority has been achieved at the expense of inclusiveness of the 
political system, transparency, and accountability of the political process; simultaneously, the 
opposition is more or less side-lined and excluded form political decision-making.  
In most democracies, problems with institutional efficiency are associated with the chronic 
problem of ambiguous or competing majorities in parliament and cabinet and the lack of stable 
party organizations. Political party systems are neither well-structured and robust nor 
fundamental underpinnings of the democratic polity. Political party development rather is one of 
the greatest shortcomings of many democratic transitions in the region. With the exception of 
India and Taiwan, most countries are stuck in one of two unpromising scenarios: either they have 
several well-entrenched political parties that have been around a long time, operate through long-
established patronage networks, and have little interest in reform, or political life is dominated by 
several recently formed parties that are essentially personalistic power structures with little 
connection to the citizenry, few internal democratic procedures, and little coherent ideology 
beyond the immediate views of the party leaders. Party systems in new democracies in Asia 
emerge around political rather than economic cleavages; where parties have adopted forms and 
issues of western political parties, they often are lacking any political meaning or serve only as 
means to mobilize public support but do not provide an ideological core around which a party can 
rotate.  
Civil society organizations and other form of civic self-organization of society manage to 
compensate only partially for the weaknesses of the party systems and to contribute to the 
diffusion of democratic values as accumulators of social capital or by developing civic culture. 
Only in South Korea, Taiwan and India, democracy is accepted as the only game in town by all 
relevant political elites. Public opinion surveys and comparative studies on political attitudes in 
several Asian countries suggest that only in these countries democracy seems to develop 
towards consolidation on the attitudinal level. In all other democracies, there is considerable 
support for democracy in general, but economic prosperity tends to trump concerns about greater 
political freedoms and rights. 
Economic Development  
Even more than politically, states in the region are drifting farther apart socio-economically. 
Except in Laos, North Korea and Myanmar, governments in the region acknowledge the goal of a 
market economy in principle. Yet, while (South)- East Asia still is one of the economically most 
dynamic regions in the world, large differences of the levels of social and economic development 
remain. As Table 2 illustrates, the differences in development are larger in this region than in any 
other. Developed ‘first world’ countries such as Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are located 
in immediate vicinity to least developed countries such as North Korea, Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar. 
Table 2: Basic Economic Indicators 








Poverty Rate 4  
Afghanistan  822  ...  0.346  35.5  60—80  
Bangladesh  1,700  5.34  0.509  31.8  82.8  
Cambodia  2,060  4.36  0.568  45.0  77.7  
China  4,580  8.18  0.745  44.7  46.7  
Korea 
(North)  
...  ...  ...  ...  ...  
Korea 
(South)  
16,950  4.78  0.888  35.2  < 2.0  
India  2,670  6.42  0.595  32.5  79.9  
Indonesia  3,230  4.05  0.692  34.3  52.4  
Laos  1,720  5.96  0.534  37.0  73.2  
Malaysia  9,120  4.20  0.793  44.0  9.3  
Myanmar  1,027  ...  0.551  ...  ...  
Nepal  1,370  3.16  0.504  36.7  82.5  
Pakistan  1,940  4.40  0.497  33.0  65.6  
Papua NG  2,270  0.68  0.542  48.7  ...  
Philippines  4,170  4.38  0.753  46.1  46.4  
Singapore  24,040  2.95  0.902  42.5  ...  
Sri Lanka  3,570  3.70  0.740  34.4  45.4  
Taiwan  23,400  2.94  0.902  32.6  0.8 5  
Thailand  7,010  5.52  0.768  43.2  32.5  
Vietnam  2,300  6.88  0.691  37.6  63.7  
1 - In 2002 US$ (PPP). 2 - Average GDP growth rate, 2001-2005; 2004 and 2005 are projections. 
3 - Latest available year, 1998-2002. 4 - Percentage of population living below $2 per day poverty 
line, 1990-2002, latest available year. 5 - Percentage of “low income population” (2003). Sources: 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2004, ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2004; ADB, Key 
Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 2004; country reports.  
Based on the criteria and findings of the BTI 2006, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan stand out 
in the region as developed market economies on a high level of social and economic 
development with a well developed institutional ‘hardware’ for a competitive market-based 
economy in place. 
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Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Thailand lag behind the first group—in some aspects far behind. Their 
institutional framework of market economy is functioning, however, and the level of performance 
on the economic criteria has improved in the past three years. In the third group of countries, the 
institutional hardware of a market economic system is emerging, only partially effective or 
otherwise transforming. Within this group, the levels of institutional transformation, levels of socio-
economic development and trends of transformation differ from each other considerably. In China, 
Vietnam, India and Pakistan, market economic reforms were developed a step further during the 
past three years and have contributed to significant, in some countries enormous, economic 
gains; in Indonesia, Bangladesh and Philippines, reform measures were less decisive, less 
significant or (Philippines) basically status quo preserving.  
The last position in the regional ranking is occupied by countries, whose economic order exhibits 
enormous institutional deficits and whose economic performance and level of social development 
lie significantly behind the other groups: Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia, North Korea, Myanmar, 
Nepal and Papua New Guinea. Especially North Korea and Myanmar are edging toward free 
markets in an uneven and inept manner and have a long way to go; particularly the ruling junta in 
Rangoon lacks capability to steer the country’s social and economic development and the political 
will to initiate development.  
To some extent, Afghanistan is a deviant case within the region. Under the Taliban, there were no 
economic policies in the strict sense and most of the economy was informal. The government of 
President Hamid Karzai has the political will for institutional and developmental reforms; however, 
it lacks the economic and political resources to develop and to implement a coherent strategy for 
national development. Outside of its immediate sphere of control the government’s influence on 
the development of prices; the stability of exchange rates; economic exchange; and the 
guarantee of property rights is very limited.  
Welfare regimes and core programs of the modern welfare state to compensate the social fallout 
and negative side-effects of market economies are underdeveloped in most area countries. 
Relatively low public expenditure on health, social security, education, housing and personal 
social services shift the burden of providing social security to the family, the community and 
charitable organizations. Levels of private spending for education and health are high and the 
extended nuclear family provides income security and borne the main burden of support for the 
elderly, unemployed and otherwise economically marginalized. Consequently, mechanisms of 
social compensation of market failures and the access to life chances depend on the market and 
the extent to which an individual is embedded into strong family and kinship ties. In the (former) 
socialist countries such as China and Vietnam, retrenchment of the once universal public safety 
net continues.  
The differences between governments in setting fiscal priorities are reflected in intraregional 
discrepancies in the access to and quality of tertiary education and the quality of the educational 
system and national capacities for research and development. Singapore, Taiwan and South 
Korea all have a well-developed and competitive educational system. Thailand has just started a 
comprehensive reform of its inefficient system of public education. Differences in the quality of the 
education systems are also manifest in the applied sciences. Only Singapore, Taiwan and South 
Korea spend more than two percent of their GNP on research and development, while R&D 
spending in all other countries is either significantly lower or negligible. Similarly significant are 
the differences in the number of scholars and engineers conducting R&D and the number of 
student enrollments in natural and engineering sciences.   
Tab.4: Spendings on R&D, Health and Education 




R&D 2  
Health  Education  
Bangladesh  ...  ...  0.9  2.4  
Cambodia  ...  ...  0.9  1.8  
China  633  1.23  ...  2.1  
Korea 
(South)  
2,979  2.91  …  4.2  
India  157  0.85  0.3  4.1  
Indonesia  130  ...  0.4  1.2  
Laos  ...  ...  1.0  2.8  
Malaysia  294  0.69  2.3  8.1  
Myanmar  ...  ...  0.2  1.3  
Nepal  62  0.67  0.9  3.4  
Pakistan  88  0.27  ...  1.8  
Papua NG  ...  ...  4.1  2.3  
Philippines  ...  ...  0.3  3.1  
Singapore  4,352  2.19  1.0  4.0  
Sri Lanka  197  0.18  1.6  2.2  
Taiwan  ...  2.20  0.2  2.4  
Thailand  289  0.24  1.0  4.6  
Vietnam  274  ...  0.8  ...  
1 - Researchers in R&D per 1,000,000 population, 2002; 2 - Percentage of GDP, 2002;  3 - 
Percentage of GDP, 2000-2003; latest available year; Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
Statistics on Research and Development, DGBAS, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 
2003, ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2004.  
Transformation Management 
Between 2003 and 2005 most area countries have neither experienced strong progress nor 
dramatic setbacks in the transformation towards democracy and market economy. However, the 
trends and tendencies of development differ considerably. Afghanistan joined the club of electoral 
democracies; Indonesia has strengthened its electoral democracy by introducing constitutional 
reforms and the conduct of competitive elections for the second time in 2004; in South Korea, the 
constitutional crisis of 2003/4 has strengthened constitutionalism and horizontal accountability. 
On the other hand, to a different extent Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand and Nepal experienced 
the erosion of democratic quality. In Bangladesh, law and order, public security and the rule of 
law is threatened by the collusion of organized crime and politics and the activities of militant 
Islamist organizations. In Pakistan, the ruling generals do not show any will to soften their grip on 
power. In Thailand, deepening unrest in the south contributes to the erosion of democratic 
standards; and in Nepal, electoral democracy has finally collapsed in February 2005. In terms of 
economic transformation, there remains a wide gap between the highly developed countries such 
as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea and the least developed economies in Southeast and 
South Asia. However, some economies such as China, India and Thailand, but also Vietnam and, 
to a lesser extent some other countries, have achieved significant or even impressive gains of 
economic growth, social development or institutional reforms.  
Comparing the BTI scores given for transformation management illustrates the high degree of 
heterogeneity in the region. Concerning the quality of the political management, the area 
governments can be grouped into five management categories: 
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South Korea and Taiwan are at the top of the management ranking. Even though political 
decision-makers in both countries followed a strategy of political and economic reforms that is 
clearly committed to democracy and socially responsible market economy, it was hampered by 
weak political leadership and the choice of confrontational tactics at some points of the review 
period. Furthermore, opposition forces, civil society groups and, sometimes, the ruling camp as 
well have placed short term interests of office-seeking or ideological principles above a strategy 
of pursuing long-term goals of political and economic transformation.  
A second group consists of Singapore, Malaysia and India. The management of political and 
economic transformation in the two Southeast Asian nations was successful in economic terms; 
in political terms, however, it was clearly aimed at preserving the semi-autocratic status quo. India, 
one of the oldest but also most persistent “defective” democracies in Asia, was categorized in this 
second highest management category, too, because of the implementation of far-reaching market 
economic reforms in recent years.  
The largest group is formed by countries with a mixed quality of transformation management: 
Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Vietnam, but also Afghanistan, 
Thailand and Sri Lanka whose ranking has either improved (Afghanistan) or worsened (Thailand, 
Sri Lanka).  
The fourth category is formed by Cambodia, Laos, Papua New Guinea and Nepal—countries, 
whose political leadership demonstrated significant shortcomings in transformation management 
in almost all criteria. Especially in Nepal, the ruling elite’s learning curve is flat and the political will 
for consensus-building and reconciliation is weak. In Cambodia and Papua NG, management is 
of particularly low quality in terms of effective use of available resources and steering capabilities. 
However, the quality of political management in these countries is still higher than in Myanmar 
and North Korea, two prime examples for the devastating consequences of a country’s leadership 
management failures in terms of improving human security and the quality of life for its own 
population.  
General points of convergence of high or low quality management in the region are two 
management criteria developed in the BTI 2006: resource efficiency and consensus -building. In 
many countries, corruption and waste of public funds are two of the biggest obstacles to 
economic development. Governments often fail to make efficient use of already scarce financial 
and human resources. The state’s extractive capacity in many countries is underdeveloped. 
Public funds are often distributed according to political and patronage considerations, and budget 
processes lack transparency. In many cases, the armed forces consume a disproportionably 
large share of the national budget. Budget deficits and public debts sometimes reach critical 
proportions. Also, less developed countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar or Papua New 
Guinea often simply do not have sufficient numbers of well-trained civil servants and neither the 
technical know how nor the professional standards necessary for an efficient public administration.  
With the exception of Singapore, corruption remains a core element of the administrative and 
political culture in almost all societies. In Singapore, government officials are recruited and 
promoted strictly on merit and civil servants are paid above-average salaries. While countries 
such as South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia do well in regional comparison, corruption levels are 
above average in interregional evaluations. Data from Transparency International and other 
institutions suggest that corruption is particularly virulent in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Vietnam.  
The steering capability of governments is also affected by institutional settings and constitutional 
constraints. However, a regional comparison demonstrates that institutional constraints on the 
capability of governments to decide and implement policies are relatively weak in most countries. 
Institutional mechanisms of power dispersion and checks and balances are the strongest in India, 
the Philippines and Afghanistan. In other countries, Unitarianism and administrative centralism, 
unicameral systems or asymmetric bicameralism, the lack of direct democracy and weak judicial 
review offer governments considerable opportunities to decide policies unilaterally and to 
implement these policies without further delay. 
Table 6: Institutional Constraints of Executive Decision-Making Authority 








Afghanistan  Unitary  High  Symmetric  No  Yes  
Bangladesh  Unitary  Low  Unicameral  No  Yes  
Kambodscha  Unitary  Low  Asymmetric  No  No  
China  Unitary  Low 1  Unicameral  No  No  
Korea Nord  Unitary  Low 1  Unicameral  No  No  
Korea Süd  Unitary  Medium  Unicameral  No  Yes  
Indien  Federal  High  Asymmetric  yes  Yes  
Indonesien  Unitary  Medium  Unicameral  No  Yes  
Laos  Unitary  Low 1  Unicameral  No  No  
Malaysia  Federal  Low  Unicameral  No  No  
Myanmar  Unitary  Low 1  Unicameral  No  No  
Nepal  Unitary  Low  Unicameral  No  No  
Pakistan  Federal  Medium  Unicameral  Yes  Yes  
Papua NG  Unitary  High  Unicameral  No  Yes  
Philippinen  Unitary  Medium  Symmetric  No  Yes  
Singapur  Unitary  Low  Unicameral  No  No  
Sri Lanka  Unitary  Medium  Unicameral  No  Yes  
Taiwan  Unitary  Low  Unicameral  No  Yes  
Thailand  Unitary  Low  Asymmetric  No  Yes  
Vietnam  Unitary  Low 1  Unicameral  No  No  
1 - Real steering capability of local authorities varies; 2 - Evaluation based on the question if 
referenda are frequent and/or take place in important policy matters.  
Of course in authoritarian regimes, the de facto degree of concentration of political power and the 
shifting relations among the ruling elites are much more relevant for the steering capabilities of 
governments than the legality of constitutional constraints. Furthermore, steering capabilities and 
assertiveness of regional or local authorities vary considerably even in unitary systems because 
of self-dynamic processes of decentralization such as in Vietnam and China or weakened 
stateness, for example in Pakistan and Indonesia.  
In addition, the steering capability of democratic governments (and, to a lesser degree, of the 
political leadership in moderate autocracies) is also subject to some political factors which are not 
relevant in closed autocracies or one-party states: the system of governance (parliamentary, 
semi-presidential or presidential government); the composition of cabinets (single party cabinets 
vs. coalition cabinets), the effective number of political parties in parliament and the degree of 
institutionalization of party systems. 
Table 7: Determinants of Steering Capability of National Governments on the Level of 
Party System and Cabinet (May 2005) 
Land  System of 
Governance  
Type of Cabinet  Percentage of 
Seats In 
Parliament of 
the Party of 
Head of 
Government 1  
Electoral 




Parties 3  
Afghanistan  Presidential  Multiparty 
cabinet  
-  -  -  
Bangladesh  Parliamentary  Four-parties 
coalition  
64.2  10.1  1.8  




50.8  48.5  2.3  
Indien  Parliamentary  Multiparty 
cabinet  
32.1  3.4  4.8  
Indonesien  Presidential  Multiparty 
coalition  
7.4  23.0  7.1  
Papua NG  Parliamentary  Multiparty 
coalition  
17.4  15.6  19.3 5  
Philippinen  Presidential  Multiparty 
cabinet  
44.0  ...  3.5  




46.6  3.5  2.8  




39.0  10.8  3.3  
Thailand  Parliamentary  One-party 
cabinet  
75.2  15.1  1.6  
  
Kambodscha  Parliamentary  Two-party 
coalition  
59.3  12.2  2.3  
Malaysia  Parliamentary  Multiparty-
coalition  
90.8  27.0  1.2  
Singapur  Parliamentary  One-party 
cabinet  
97.6  17.4  1.04  
  
Pakistan  Parliamentary  Three-party 
coalition  
36.8 9  42.6  4.3  
Nepal  Parliamentary  -  -  -  -  
Vietnam  Socialist One-Party System  
China  Socialist One-Party System  
Korea Nord  Socialist One-Party System  
Laos  Socialist One-Party System  
Myanmar  Military Junta  
1 - Latest election; 2 - Last two elections; 3 - Latest election. Source: Author’s calculation based 
on data from country reports. 
For example, the steering performance of many democratic governments is hampered by a lack 
of internal cohesion of fragmented multiparty coalitions or (in presidential systems) competing 
party majorities in parliament and executive which are blocking each other. Extreme examples 
are Indonesia and Papua New Guinea where high fragmentation of parliaments demands the 
formation of heterogeneous multiparty coalitions and Taiwan and South Korea, where minority 
presidents are the rule. Oversized cabinets and ministerial bureaucracies, low assertiveness of 
cabinets and the lack of legislative support are the consequences of these developments. In 
addition, high electoral volatility also complicates the planning and implementation of mid-to-long-
term oriented policies.  
However, high volatility rates are not always indicators for strongly fluctuating party preferences 
among the electorate or weakly institutionalized party systems. For example, high volatility rates 
in the last elections in Malaysia and Singapore do not indicate a crisis of both hegemonic party 
systems, but rather the reassurance of the established structures. In fact, the rising electoral 
volatility in both countries is a consequence of the ruling parties’ ability to stop the erosion of their 
electoral support and to regain votes which in previous elections had gone to opposition parties. 
Of course, interference with opposition parties and an unfair electoral system contributed to this 
outcome, too; however, the fact that the government offered substantial policies in order to 
counter the oppositional challenges is also one factor that explains to some extent how 
authoritarian leaders in Singapore and Malaysia successfully neutralized deepening dissent in 
their societies.  
In this regard, the low fragmentation of the party systems point to severe restrictions of party 
competition in both countries. Therefore and due to the cooptation of social organizations into 
government and party apparatuses, Singapore and Malaysia are ranked below South Korea, 
Taiwan, and India in terms of consensus-building. However, both score better than most other 
countries in the region because the political leadership in Singapore and Malaysia was able to 
prevent large-scale radicalization of ethno-religious conflicts through the establishment of 
inclusive inter-ethnic elite alliances and distributing economic gains among all ethnic groups. 
Most other governments in South and Southeast Asia are considerably less successful in building 
social consensus. Low-quality of conflict management in those countries is reflected in higher 
levels of political violence. In the wake of the events of 9/11, particularly Southeast Asia has 
achieved a dubious reputation as a “Second Front” in the war on terrorism and as a major hotspot 
of transnational Islamist terrorism.  
Certainly the quality of political management of transformation is also affected by structural 
constraints for transformation that do not result from the current political leadership’s actions and 
can not be swiftly overcome by the current leadership such as extreme poverty, the lack of an 
educated labor force, natural disasters, or existing ethnic, religious and social conflicts, and the 
lack of traditions of civil society. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index takes these factors into 
account with the criterion of the degree of difficulty. The degree of structural constraints of 
successful transformation management is the strongest in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal, 
followed by Myanmar. In Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, India and the 
Philippines, low levels of socio-economic development, insufficient human resources and capital, 
a lack of strong traditions of civil society and the rule of law and weak bureaucratic capabilities 
also make reform politics difficult.  
A closer inspection, however, reveals that the assumption that the lower the degree of difficulty, 
the higher the steering capabilities of political leaders and the level of transformation towards 
democracy and market economy, is only to some extent valid. Certainly, countries such as South 
Korea and Taiwan benefit from the absence of deep ethno-religious conflicts, high levels of 
socioeconomic modernization and a “strong state”. On the other hand, severe conditions such as 
in Afghanistan constitute obstacles for economic and political reforms which are hard to 
overcome even with an ideal strategy of transformation. But many countries are located between 
these two extremes; their current status of transformation reflects only to some extent the degree 
of difficulties. A prime example is India: although the degree of difficulties is significantly higher in 
India than in Thailand, the Philippines, or Malaysia, the status of democracy in India is 
significantly higher than in those other countries.  
Particularly the weak correlation between democracy status and degree of difficulties illustrates 
that politics matter. Only in three out of twenty countries (Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan), the 
(low) status of democracy clearly reflects the (high) degree of difficulties, whereas most of the 
other countries do considerably better or worse in terms of democratic transformation than one 
would expect given the degree of difficulties. The correlation between degree of difficulties and 
market economic development is stronger. For example, the high values Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan receive in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006 strongly support the 
assumption that transformation is the easier, the weaker the structural constraints for market 
economic development. However, more revealing are the “deviant cases”. For example, North 
Korea and Myanmar are relatively worse off than one would expect, whereas Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Pakistan and Nepal are ‘overachievers’ compared with the degree of difficulties for economic 
transformation. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The present report on the state of democratic and economic reforms in Asia and Oceania proves 
that the region-wide trend towards market economy continues; however, market economic 
transformation is more advanced in this region than democratic transformation. In fact, the third 
wave of democratization has come to a halt in this region. Based on the criteria of the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006 the twenty nations in Asia and Oceania cluster into five 
groups: 
Results of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006 for Asia and Oceania 
 · Countries at an advanced stage of economic and democratic transformation whose 
political leadership by and large has demonstrated a good management performance 
(South Korea and Taiwan).  
· Nations in which the transformation towards democracy and market economy lag behind 
the first group, either because of difficult conditions and/or because of shortcomings or 
failures of political management; the trend of development in both dimensions of 
transformation do not point in a single direction (Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines).  
· States on a high to very high level of socioeconomic development in which the transition 
to democracy is blocked: Singapore and Malaysia.  
· Autocracies whose level of social and economic development has improved in the last 
three years and which are on the road to successful transformation from socialist plan to 
capitalist economy but whose political leadership attempts to prevent the emergence of 
democratic opposition and blocks political liberalization: China and Vietnam.  
· The fifth group consists of political systems that must be classified either as very weak 
electoral democracies or as autocracies and market economies which are at best highly 
deficient or rudimentary: Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and North Korea.  
While the countries in this last group are the main countries of concern in Asia, the first group is 
the role model in Asia (and beyond) for successful economic and democratic transformation. As 
such, the countries of this group undermine the official position of the governments in Malaysia 
and Singapore that “more” democracy necessarily threatens economic development. On the 
other hand, Taiwan and South Korea (as well as many other countries in Asia and in other 
regions in the world) may in fact learn from Singapore’s experiences of fighting corruption, 
improving bureaucratic efficiently and the effective use of resources.  
The experiences made in the democracies in Asia reveal a high degree of diversity in the 
dynamics and status of development towards liberal democracy. While democratization in South 
Korea and Taiwan is following the path towards liberal democracy, most other new democracies 
in the region seem not to transition into this direction, but rather they are stuck in transition or 
even show symptoms of autocratic regression. Simultaneously, there is a pronounced decoupling 
of democratic and economic transformation in many of the remaining autocracies in the region. 
The experiences of Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and China show that simultaneous 
democratization and introduction or deepening of market economy is not the dominant model in 
Asia. The following figure illustrates this trend towards a one-dimensional or sequential 
transformation in the region: 
Correlation of Democracy Status with Status of Market Economy  
 
The BTI assessments for Asia and Oceania indicate that the levels of democratic and market 
development are highly correlated only in seven of twenty countries. Five of those countries 
(Myanmar, North Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan) receive low to very low scores in 
both dimensions which indicates a generally low level of democracy and market economic 
transformation. On the other hand, Taiwan and South Korea receive high scores in both 
dimensions—an indication for the advanced status of market-based democracy in both countries.  
In the remaining thirteen countries, both indices significantly differ. In Papua New Guinea, 
Bangladesh, Philippines, India and Indonesia the status index for democracy is higher than the 
status index of market economy. These five countries are examples of (defective) democracy in 
under- or less developed countries. On the other hand, there is a group of eight countries in 
which democratic transformation lags behind economic transformation: Thailand, Laos, Pakistan, 
Nepal, Vietnam, China, Malaysia and Singapore. While the group of democratic “overachiever” 
demonstrates that (defective) democracy is possible even with unfavorable socioeconomic 
preconditions, the second group of “democratic underachiever” illustrates the previously 
mentioned trend towards decoupling of both transformations. The experiences made in both 
groups support the main finding of the BTI 2006: Politics matter.  
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